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Patterson: Torts: Common Law Defenses Not Applicable in Wrongful Death Actio

CASE COMMENTS
TORTS: COMMON LAW DEFENSES NOT APPLICABLE IN
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION INVOLVING
MARITIME TORT
Weed v. Bilbrey, 201 So. 2d 771 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967)
The plaintiff's husband and the defendant were involved in an airboat
collision that resulted in injuries ultimately causing the death of the husband.
The accident occurred on the Kissimmee River, a navigable body of water,
thereby bringing principles of maritime law into effect.' Plaintiff brought
two suits against defendant, which were consolidated for trial: (1) as administratrix to recover for the pain and suffering of the decedent pursuant to the
survival statute; 2 and (2) for damages from the wrongful death of the decedent pursuant to the Florida Wrongful Death Statute.3 The trial court held
for the plaintiff in the first action on the ground that the partial defense of
comparative negligence was applicable as provided under admiralty law. 4 In
the wrongful death action, however, the trial court held that the common
law defense of contributory negligence precluded recovery. 5 The plaintiff
appealed the denial of recovery for wrongful death and the Second District
Court of Appeal HELD, the partial admiralty defense of comparative negligence was applicable in the wrongful death action since the suit was predicated upon a maritime tort committed on navigable waters within the state.
Judgment reversed.
An established principle of general maritime law, as well as of common
law, is that there is no right to recover damages for death resulting from the
I. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959).
2. FLA. STAT. §46.021 (1967).
3. FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1967): "Whenever the death of any person in this state shall
be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any individual or individuas . . . (or ... of any ship, vessel or boat or persons employed thereon), and the act,
negligence, carelessness or default, is such as would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured thereby to maintain an action (or to proceed in rem against the said
ship, vessel or boat, or in personam against the owners thereof) ... then and in every such
case the person or persons . . . (or the ship, vessel or boat), which would have been
liable ... to an action for damages (or if a ship, vessel or boat, to a libel in rem, and her
owners or those responsible . . . to a libel in personam) notwithstanding the death of the
person injured ......
4. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959).
5. The survival statute, FLA. STAT. §46.021 (1967), continues the cause of action after
the injured party's death. The wrongful death statute, FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1967), creates
an entirely new cause of action in the beneficiaries named under FLA. STAT. §768.02 (1967).
This distinction between the two statutes may explain the apparently conflicting result
reached by the trial court. It could not have denied relief under the survival statute, as
the decedent himself had a right of action against the defendant, which passed to one
prescribed by law. But the wrongful death statute creates an entirely new right in the
beneficiaries; and the court either overlooked or refused to recognize the latent inconsistencies in denying recovery under the wrongful death statute on the particular facts of
the case.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

1

UNIVERSITY
OFLaw
FLORIDA
LAW
[Vol. XX
Florida
Review,
Vol.REVIEW
20, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 10

tortious conduct of another in the absence of state or federal enabling legislation.6 But without such legislation Dean Prosser sardonically suggests it
is more profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him. 7
Congress, pursuant to its constitutional power to legislate on the subject, s
has provided a partial remedy for the common law situation by giving a
right to recover damages for wrongful death of seamen or others on the high
seas. 9 Yet, an obvious gap in the federal legislation is that there is no statute
extant providing a remedy for wrongful death of nonseamen on navigable
waters within the territorial limits of a state; 10 and in such a situation the
wrongful death statute of the state in whose territorial waters the death
took place must be the enabling law." The state statutes may be implemented
in maritime cases by either federal or state courts' 2 when the state legislation
is not "hostile to the characteristic features of the maritime law or inconsistent
with federal legislation."13
In maritime torts not encompassed by federal legislation the development
of the Florida Wrongful Death Statute has been guided by federal decisions
until the instant case. 14 The essential holding of Graham v. A. Lusi, Ltd.' 5
and Emerson v. Holloway Concrete Products Co.,' 6 the federal cases in point,

was that a right of action stemming from a maritime tort brought under the
Florida Wrongful Death Statute, was to be enforced according to the principles of common law. If the instant case had followed these cases, the common law defense of contributory negligence would have been an absolute
bar to recovery. A strong dissenting opinion was filed in the Emerson case,
however, chastising the majority for looking to prior federal cases interpreting the Florida statute rather than focusing on the plain meaning of
the statute itself.
The plaintiff in the instant case was thus faced with two adverse federal
cases construing the wrongful death statute. The Second District Court of
Appeal, however, specifically rejected these cases noting with approval the
6. Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 318 (1960); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886);
Chamberlain v. Florida Power & Light Corp., 144 Fla. 719, 198 So. 486 (1940); Bowie v.
Reynolds, 161 So. 2d 882 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964); 9 FLA. JUR. Death by Wrongful Act §4
(1956).
7. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 924 (3d ed. 1964).
8. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 404 (1907); U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8; Id. art. 3, §2.
9. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§761-68 (1965); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §688
(1965).
10. M. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 372, 373 (1959).
11. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); M. NoRIs, supra note 10, at 363;
for a compilation of wrongful death statutes of the various states see 6A A. KNAUTr,
KNAUTH'S BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY (7th ed. 1958).
12. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Reed
Constr. Corp., 149 So. 2d 578 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); 29 FLA. JUR. Ships and Shipping §7
(1960).
13. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 388 (1941); 29 FLA. JuR. Ships and Shipping §10
(1960); M. NORRIS, supra note 10, at 373.
14. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
15. 206 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1953).
16. 282 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1960).
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"excellent and well reasoned dissent" in Emerson. 7 Echoing the reasoning
of the Emerson dissent, the court saw as the compelling factor for its holding
the specific language of the wrongful death statute covering deaths resulting
from maritime injuries and mentioning remedies applicable only in admiralty.' s The test for recovery under the wrongful death statute is simply
whether the decedent could have recovered had he survived and sued.19 The
admiralty language makes the test even more precise in cases involving maritime torts, as the query is whether the decedent could have recovered, had
he lived, in an admiralty proceeding in rem against the vessel or in personam
against the owners. 20 Either proceeding would necessarily incorporate the
admiralty defense of comparative negligence. 21 Since it is dearly settled that
if Wayne Weed had survived, comparative negligence would have governed
his action for damages in a Florida court,22 a holding applying a standard
other than comparative negligence in the wrongful death action would
clearly violate the terms of the statutory test. An application of contributory
negligence in the instant case would also create the very situation the statute
was designed to prevent; it would have been more profitable for the defendant
to kill the decedent than to scratch him.23 Thus, Dean Prosser's comment
on the common law rule barring recovery for wrongful death24 is equally
applicable to the trial court's interpretation of the wrongful death statute;
and the irony of his comment is not lessened by the remedial nature of such
legislation. 25
The instant decision places Florida in line with the majority of states
having wrongful death statutes that preserve the rights, which the decedent
would have had if his injuries had not been fatal.26 Texas, it might be noted,

came to the same result27 on the basis of a statute28 like Florida's but without
maritime tort language, a United States court of appeals decision to the con17. 201 So. 2d 771, 774 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
18. FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1967). Apparently there is no legislative history on the Florida

statute. Emerson v. Holloway Concrete Prods. Co., 282 F.2d 271, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1960); see
Holley v. The Mansfred Stansfield, 269 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1959), cited in the instant case at
773, dealing with a wrongful death statute similar to that of Florida.
19. FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1967); see Emerson v. Holloway Concrete Prods. Co., 282 F.2d
271, 278 (5th Cir. 1960) (dissenting opinion); Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628

(1940).
20. Emerson v. Holloway Concrete Prods. Co., 282 F.2d 271, 278 (5th Cir. 1960) (dissenting opinion).
21. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959).
22. The trial court made a tacit admission of this fact when it held for the plaintiff
in the survival action under FLA.

STAT.

§46.021 (1967). See Judy v. Belk, 181 So. 2d 694,

695 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
23. See Emerson v. Holloway Concrete Prods. Co., 282 F.2d 271, 278 (5th Cir. 1960)
(dissenting opinion).
24. W. PRossER, supra note 7, at 964.
25. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Reed Constr. Corp., 149 So. 2d 578 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1963).
26. See cases cited at 744 n.2 of the instant case.
27. Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomy Maats Holland, 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d 421
(1961), cited at 744 of the instant case.
28. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-78 (1952).
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trary notwithstanding. 29 The Supreme Court of Texas reasoned that since
the defendant would not have been barred by his contributory negligence,
his beneficiaries should not be barred. The court felt this result was compelled by the express wording of the statute even without the indicia of
legislative intent coming from maritime tort language.
It may be argued that a different result should be reached in such cases
on the ground that there is little need for the law to favor a relatively small
number of death act plaintiffs, whose decedents have met their deaths as a
result of maritime torts, over a much larger group that must accept the
30
unfavorable as well as the favorable aspects of wrongful death legislation.
Motorboat and automobile collisions are not essentially different in nature,
and plaintiffs in automobile wrongful death actions must contend with the
absolute defense of contributory negligence. But it is difficult for such an
argument to stand in light of the specific provisions of the wrongful death
statute. 31 The Florida statute gives a right of action for wrongful death to
certain persons 32 if the decedent would have had an action against the offending party had he lived; and the plaintiff's decedent in the instant case would
unquestionably have had a right of action against the defendant. Denial of
recovery for the plaintiff would carve out an exception to the statute unwarranted by its wording. While it is perhaps impossible for courts to achieve
perfect legal symmetry between the wrongful death statute and the common
law until a comparative negligence standard is adopted in all actions in tort,
the legislature is not bound in its actions to conform to the desires of the
logician.
JOHN C. PATTERSON, JR.

29. Truelson v. Whitney & Baldwin Shipping Co., 10 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1925).
30. M. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 378 (1959).
31. FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1967).
32. FLA. STAT. §768.02 (1967).
Editor's Note: The principal case was argued before the Supreme Court of Florida on
appeal and certiorari May 15, 1968, and was under consideration at the time of publication.
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